Tampered Claude Code Extension Found In Cursor's Marketplace: Who Needs To Check
On 29 October 2026, Cursor found a tampered copy of the Claude Code extension in its own marketplace. Only Cursor users who installed versions 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 from that marketplace are affected, so if your developers or contractors use Cursor, have them run Cursor's check.
On 29 October 2026, Cursor, the code editor, published a security notice. A tampered copy of Anthropic’s Claude Code extension had been listed in Cursor’s own extension marketplace. The bad copies were versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, for Windows and macOS.
Some headlines called this an Anthropic hack. Cursor’s notice says otherwise. In Cursor’s words: “These malicious versions of the extension were not developed by Anthropic.”
What Happened
Cursor says the tampered extension was available in its marketplace from about 2:27am to 1:35pm Pacific time on 29 October. That’s roughly 8:27pm on 29 October to 7:35am on 30 October in Sydney and Melbourne, or 5:27pm to 4:35am in Perth.
According to Cursor, the hidden code did four things:
- Sent details about the computer to the attacker, including the hostname, username, operating system, home folder path, the names of environment variables, the Git email address and the public IP address.
- Added the attacker’s SSH key, labelled
svc-telemetry, to the machine’s list of trusted keys. - Tried to switch on remote login and open a tunnel back to the attacker.
- Installed background scripts that retry that tunnel about every 60 seconds.
Switching on remote login needs admin rights, which the extension didn’t have on most Mac and Windows machines. Cursor says that on those machines the attacker couldn’t have logged in through the tunnel. The key, the background scripts and the upload of computer details did go through.
Cursor pulled the tampered versions when it found them and shut the whole marketplace down as a precaution. It checked that no other extensions had been changed, rotated its keys and rebuilt the marketplace before bringing it back online. It also worked with the hosting provider to take the attacker’s server offline. Cursor says the tunnel and the data upload no longer work as a result.
Reuters reported that Cursor put the number of affected users at up to 5,000.
As of 2 November 2026, Anthropic hadn’t published a formal security advisory, so Cursor’s notice is the main source. An Anthropic staff member did comment on X.
What It Means For Your Business
This incident is narrow. It only touches people who installed or updated the Claude Code extension through Cursor’s marketplace during that window.
If your team uses Claude in the browser, the Claude apps, or Claude Code installed from Anthropic, this isn’t about you. The tampered copy only existed in Cursor’s marketplace, and Cursor says it has no evidence that other versions of the extension or the official distribution were affected.
It does matter for the people who write code for you. If a developer, contractor or agency builds software for your business, find out whether they use Cursor. A developer’s laptop often has access to your website, database, cloud accounts and sometimes your customers’ systems. An attacker’s key on that laptop is a real problem, even where the tunnel failed. Cursor says the limited data the extension collected doesn’t rule out the attacker reaching credentials later through the backdoor.
The wider lesson for owners: your risk from a tool depends on where your people installed it from, as well as which brand is on the label. The same extension came through two channels, and Cursor has found no sign the official one was touched.
What To Check
Ask anyone who writes code for you one question. Did you install or update the Claude Code extension through Cursor on 29 or 30 October, Australian time?
If the answer is yes, or they aren’t sure, have them run the check in Cursor’s notice. It’s one line on a Mac and two lines in PowerShell on Windows. It looks for an SSH key labelled svc-telemetry on the machine.
- No key found: Cursor says the machine isn’t impacted.
- Key found: the machine is impacted. Cursor’s steps are to isolate it, run Cursor’s clean-up script for that platform, remove the key and the background scripts, and decide whether to rebuild the machine. Then change every password, key and login that machine could reach, using a different computer you trust.
Don’t stop at uninstalling the extension. Cursor warns that may not be enough, because the attack leaves its own scripts behind and they keep running.
Cursor names Windows and macOS as affected. Its list of warning signs also includes Linux file paths, so if anyone on your team runs Cursor on Linux, have them run the Mac check too.
If a contractor or agency has access to your systems, email them and ask whether they’ve run it. That covers a machine you don’t control.
For the bigger question of how to connect AI tools to your business without handing over the keys, read our guide on whether AI automation is safe for your business data.
Sources
Go Deeper
- Is It Safe To Connect AI Automation To Your Business Data? →
How AI automation keeps your business data safe: built in your own stack, least-privilege access, human-in-the-loop, and what to ask before connecting anything.
- What Claude Code Actually Does For A Business →
What Claude Code does for a business: the build engine that turns plain-English processes into working automation logic on top of Make.com and n8n.
Sam co-founded Echelon AI Solutions and leads transformation strategy, client engagements and growth. He has built and operated businesses across marketing and AI education, and has guided companies in retail, trades, hospitality and professional services through operational change. His focus is making AI earn its place through measurable business performance.